We study properties related to relevance in non-monotonic consequence relations obtained by systems of structured argumentation. Relevance desiderata concern the robustness of a consequence relation under the addition of irrelevant information. For an account of what (ir)relevance amounts to we use syntactic and semantic considerations. Syntactic criteria have been proposed in the domain of relevance logic and were recently used in argumentation theory under the names of non-interference and crashresistance. The basic idea is that the conclusions of a given argumentative theory should be robust under adding information that shares no propositional variables with the original database. Some semantic relevance criteria are known from non-monotonic logic. For instance, cautious monotony states that if we obtain certain conclusions from an argumentation theory, we may expect to still obtain the same conclusions if we add some of them to the given database. In this paper we investigate properties of structured argumentation systems that warrant relevance desiderata.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate conditions under which the non-monotonic consequence relation of a given structured argumentation system is robust when irrelevant information is added or removed. Relevance can hereby be understood in two ways. First, syntactically as information that shares propositional variables with the information at hand. Second, semantically, as information that for some reason should not be considered to have defeating power over previously accepted arguments.
Structured argumentation has been studied in various settings such as ASPIC [19, 20] , ABA [7, 21] , and logic-based argumentation [2, 5, 6] . These frameworks share the underlying idea that arguments are to have a logical structure and attacks between them are at least partially determined by logical considerations. Although investigations into translations between these frameworks have been intensified recently [14] , the frameworks are in various aspects difficult to compare and results obtained in one do not easily transfer to others. For this reason, we decided in this paper to study relevance-related properties for structured argumentation on the basis of a simple framework for structured argumentation that allows us, on the one hand, to abstract away from particularities of the systems from the literature and, on the other hand, to translate these frameworks easily. The framework is simple in that arguments are premise-conclusion pairs (Γ, γ) obtained from a given consequence relation and it only allows for one type of attack (attacks in premises). The obtained simplicity makes studying meta-theory technically straight-forward and the availability of the translations makes results easily transferable.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our general setting for structured argumentation. In Section 3 we define the basic relevance-related properties that we will investigate in this paper. In Section 4 we show how many of the most common systems of structured argumentation can be represented in our setting. In Section 5 we prove our main results. We conclude in Section 6.
General Setting
In the following we work with a simple setting for structured argumentation. It is abstract in the sense that it allows for instantiations that are adequate representations of many of the available systems of structured The paper has been published in the proceedings of IJCAI 2018, main track.
argumentation such as logic-based argumentation, ASPIC, ABA, etc. (see Sec. 4) . In this contribution we restrict ourselves to non-prioritized settings.
We suppose to have available a formal language L (we denote the set of well-formed formulas over L also by L) and a relation ⊢ ⊆ ℘ fin (L) × L (where ℘ fin denotes the set of finite subsets) which we will refer to as the deducability relation. We do not suppose any of the usual Tarskian properties in what follows (reflexivity, transitivity, and monotonicity).
Definition 1 (Arg ⊢ (·)). Given a set of formulas S ⊆ L we denote by Arg ⊢ (S) the set of S-based arguments: (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) iff Γ ⊢ γ for Γ ⊆ S. Given a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S), Conc(a) = γ and Supp(a) = Γ.
To accommodate argumentative attacks we suppose to have two functions: a contrariness function · : L → ℘(L) that associates each formula with a set of conflicting formulas and a function · : ℘ fin (L)\∅ → ℘ fin (L) that associates support sets with sets of formulas in which they can be attacked. Remark 1. Often · will simply be the identity function, although another option is, e.g.,
Definition 2 (AF ⊢ ). An (argumentation) setting is a triple AF ⊢ = (⊢, ·, ·). A setting based on S ⊆ L is given by the quadruple AF ⊢ (S) = (S, ⊢, ·, ·).
where ⊢ CL is the deducability relation of classical propositional logic and φ = {¬φ}.
Example 2. Another example is the setting AF
Our attack form is sometimes called premise-attack [20] or directed undercut [6] . In Section 4 we will show that by adjusting · and · adequately we are able to accommodate many other attack forms defined in the literature.
Definition 4 (Attack Diagram). Given a setting AF ⊢ (S), its attack diagram is the directed graph with the set of nodes Arg ⊢ (S) and edges between a and b iff a attacks b.
Definition 5 (Dung Semantics, [12] ). Where AF ⊢ (S) is a setting and A ⊆ Arg ⊢ (S) we define: A is conflict-free iff there are no a, b ∈ A such that a attacks b. A defends a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) iff for each attacker b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) of a there is a c ∈ A that attacks b. A is admissible iff it is conflict-free and it defends every a ∈ A. A is complete iff it is admissible and it contains every a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) it defends. A is preferred iff it is ⊆-maximal complete. A is grounded iff it is ⊆-minimal complete. A is stable iff it is admissible and for all a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) \ A there is a b ∈ A that attacks a.
We denote the set of all admissible [complete, preferred, stable] sets A (also called "extensions") by Adm(AF ⊢ (S)) [Cmp(AF ⊢ (S)), Prf(AF ⊢ (S)), Stb(AF ⊢ (S))] and the grounded set by Grd(AF ⊢ (S)).
Definition 6 (Consequence Relations). Where Sem ∈ {Grd, Prf, Stb}, and given a setting AF ⊢ we define: S |∼ in S 1 also occurs in a formula in S 2 and vice versa: so Atoms(S 1 ) ∩ Atoms(S 2 ) = ∅ where Atoms(S) is the set of atoms occurring in formulas in S. In such cases we write:
Definition 7 (Non-Interference, [9] ). |∼ ⊆ ℘(L)×L satisfies Non-Interference iff for all S 1 ∪{φ}∪S 2 ⊆ L for which (S 1 ∪ {φ}) | S 2 we have:
, is called contaminating (with respect to |∼), if for any set of formulas S ′ ⊆ L such that S | S ′ and for every φ ∈ L, it holds that S |∼ φ if and only if S ∪ S ′ |∼ φ.
Consequence relations that are non-trivial and satisfy Non-Interference also satisfy Crash-Resistance:
2 Definition 9 (Crash-Resistance, [9] ). A consequence relation |∼ ⊆ ℘(L) × L satisfies Crash-Resistance iff there is no set S ⊆ L that is contaminating with respect to |∼.
Given a setting AF ⊢ , a natural question is whether Non-Interference is a property that gets inherited on the level of non-monotonic inference |∼ Sem from ⊢: we will show below that in case ⊢ satisfies NonInterference so does |∼ Sem . In fact, the following less requiring criterion is sufficient:
When considering attacks we need to extend the notion of Pre-Relevance by taking into account · and ·. We first define:
for which Atoms(S 1 ), Atoms(T 1 ) ⊆ A 1 and Atoms(S 2 ), Atoms(T 2 ) ⊆ A 2 , and for all φ and ψ for which ψ ∈ φ and φ ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 , we have: Proof. Items (i) and (iii) are trivial. For Item (ii) suppose that S 1 ∪ S 2 ⊢ ψ, where ψ = ¬φ and φ ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 = T 1 ∪ T 2 and where S 1 , S 2 , T 1 , T 2 are as in Def. 11. Thus, there is an i ∈ {1, 2} s.t. φ ∈ T i . Thus, Atoms(ψ) ⊆ A i . By the Pre-Relevance of ⊢, there is an
, the Pre-Relevance of (⊢, ·, ·) follows from the Pre-Relevance of ⊢.
In Section 5.1 we will show that: Example 6. Recently paraconsistent logics based on maximal consistent subsets [13] have been used in the context of structured argumentation. A refinement of Theorem 1 is given in Corollary 1 below.
Definition 13. Given a setting (⊢, ·, ·) let ⊢ ∅ be the restriction of ⊢ to pairs (Γ, γ) for which there is no (∅, δ) ∈ ⊢ such that δ ∈ ψ for some ψ ∈ Γ.
Since arguments with empty supports have no attackers we have:
We illustrate the latter point with an example. In the following sections we will relate these results to systems of structured argumentation from the literature.
Semantic Relevance
As for semantic relevance we study in this paper a criterion known from non-monotonic logic, namely Cumulativity.
setting AF ⊢ and a semantics Sem ∈ {Grd, Prf, Sem} let |∼ On the level of consequence relations Cumulativity is the following property, intuitively expressing that the consequence set is invariant under the addition of derivable formulas to the premises:
On the level of Dung-extensions, Cumulativity is:
Definition 16 (Extensional Cumulativity). A setting AF ⊢ satisfies Extensional Cumulativity for Sem ∈ {Grd, Prf, Stb} if and only if for all S ∪ {φ} ⊆ L such that S |∼ Sem φ we have that:
We will show, in Section 5.2, that a setting AF ⊢ satisfies Cumulativity for grounded semantics if AF ⊢ is pointed: If we restrict ⊢ to consistent sets on the left side, denoted by ⊢ con (see Def. 19 below) and if ⊢ satisfies Cut and Contraposition (see Def. 18 below), then the setting AF con = (⊢ con , ·, id) is cumulative. In more detail:
Theorem 3. Where AF ⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable and ⊢ satisfies Cut, AF con = (⊢ con , ·, id) is cumulative and extensionally cumulative for Sem ∈ {Grd, Prf, Stb}.
Example 9. In view of Theorem 3, AF ⊢ ⊤ CL from Ex. 5 is cumulative for Sem ∈ {Grd, Stb, Prf}.
Systems of Structured Argumentation
In this section we take a look at several of the structured argumentation frameworks from the literature and show how they can be represented in our setting.
Example 10 (Logic-Based Argumentation). Logic-based argumentation is closest to our setting from Section 2. Systems can be found in, for instance, [2, 5] . 3 The core logic L is a finitary Tarskian logic with an adequate consequence relation ⊢ ⊆ ℘ fin (L) × L. Given a set S ⊆ L, the set of arguments defined by Arg ⊢ (S) consists of all (Γ, γ) where Γ ⊢ γ and Γ ⊆ S just like in Def. 1. Different attack rules have been proposed, such as:
Dung semantics are defined as usual on top of an attack diagram analogous to Definitions 4 and 5. Consequence relations are defined analogous to Definition 6 S ∼ Sem φ iff in all Sem-extensions there is an argument (Γ, φ).
Systems of logic-based argumentation translate rather directly to our setting. We only need to adjust the definitions of · and · so that we can use our attack definition to simulate the attack definitions above. The following table shows how:
The easy proof concerning the adequacy of our representations is omitted for reasons of space.
Remark 3. The definitions for direct attack forms (DiDef, DiUcut, DiCoDef) all give rise to a pointed · (namely id) in our representation. Thus, combining these attack forms with core logics L for which ⊢ L satisfies Cut, we obtain Cumulativity.
Remark 4. Instantiating logic-based argumentation with a core logic that satisfies Pre-Relevance (such as the ones in Examples 4, 5, 6) we obtain Non-Interference.
Example 11 (Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA), [7] ). Let L be a formal language, · : L → ℘(L) a contrariness function, Ab ⊆ L a subset of so-called assumptions, and R be a set of rules of the form φ 1 , . . . , φ n → φ where φ 1 , . . . , φ n , φ ∈ L and φ / ∈ Ab. 4 There is an R-deduction from some ∆ ⊆ Ab to φ iff there is a sequence φ 1 , . . . , φ n for which ∆ = {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } ∩ Ab, φ n = φ and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, φ i is either in ∆ or there is a rule φ i1 , . . . , φ im → φ i where i 1 , . . . , i m < i. Given two sets of assumptions ∆, ∆ ′ ⊆ Ab, ∆ attacks ∆ ′ iff there is a δ ∈ ∆ ′ for which there is an R-deduction of some ψ ∈ δ from some ∆ ′′ ⊆ ∆. Subsets of assumptions in Ab and attacks between them give rise to an attack diagram where nodes are sets of assumptions and arcs are attacks. Dung-style semantics are applied to these graphs: ∆ is conflict-free if it does not attack itself, ∆ is admissible if it defends itself, it is complete if it contains all assumptions it defends, it is preferred if it is maximally admissible and stable if it is admissible and attacks every assumption it does not contain. Given a semantics Sem, a consequence relation is given by (Ab, R) ∼ aba Sem φ iff φ is R-derivable from all sets of assumptions ∆ ⊆ Ab that satisfy the requirements of Sem.
In most presentations of ABA, the rules R are considered domain-specific strict inference rules that are part of a given knowledge base. They may also be obtained from an underlying core logic L with consequence relation ⊢ L by setting φ 1 , . . . , φ n → φ iff {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } ⊢ L φ.
We can translate ABA into our setting as follows. Where R represents domain-specific rules that are part of the knowledge base, we define for ∆ ⊆ Ab and R ′ ⊆ R:
there is an R-deduction of φ from ∆ making use of the rules in R ′ (and only of these). 5 Where R is generated from a given core logic L, we define for ∆ ⊆ Ab:
In both cases, we use the definition of · from ABA, let · = id(·). Clearly, in our setting (∆, δ) attacks (Γ, γ) iff δ ∈ φ for some φ ∈ Γ. For reasons of space we omit the proof that the setting AF ⊢ (Ab ∪ R) [resp. AF ⊢ (Ab)] adequately represents the ABA framework based on Ab and R for ⊢ in ( † aba ) [resp.
Remark 5. It is easy to see that for representation ( † aba ) the underlying consequence relation ⊢ satisfies Pre-Relevance and if ( †) Atoms(φ) ⊆ Atoms(φ) for all φ ∈ L, we obtain Non-Interference. For the representation ( ‡ aba ) it depends on the logic L. In case ⊢ L satisfies Pre-Relevance and if ( †) we obtain Non-Interference.
Remark 6. Our representation of ABA makes use of the pointed · (namely id) and R-derivability satisfies Cut. Note that AF ⊢ +φ (Ab ∪ R) [resp. AF ⊢ +φ (Ab)] adequately represents the ABA framework based on (Ab, R ∪ {→ φ}) for ⊢ in ( † aba ) [resp. for ⊢ in ( ‡ aba )]. Thus we obtain Cumulativity.
Example 12 (ASPIC, [19, 20] ). In ASPIC we work with a formal language L, a contrariness function · : L → ℘(L), a set of defeasible rules D and a set of strict rules R of the form A 1 , . . . , A n ⇒ A resp. A 1 , . . . , A n → A. Similarly as was the case for ABA, the strict rules may reflect domain-specific knowledge or be generated in view of an underlying core logic L. We assume that L contains for each defeasible rule R ∈ D a logical atom n(R) that serves as name of R. An (D, R)-deduction of φ ∈ L from ∆ ⊆ L is given by a tree
• whose leaves are labeled by elements in ∆ (so that each δ ∈ ∆ occurs as label of a leaf),
• for every non-root node labeled by ψ there is a rule R = φ 1 , . . . , φ n → ψ ∈ R or R = φ 1 , . . . , φ n ⇒ ψ ∈ D and its child-nodes are labeled by φ 1 , . . . , φ n (if R has an empty body, the single child-node is unlabeled). The edges connecting the child-nodes with the parent are labeled R.
6
• the root of the tree is labeled by φ.
is the set of all node labels to which an edge labeled with a defeasible [strict] rule leads and DefR(a) [StrR(a)] is the set of all edge labels that are defeasible [strict] rules.
An argumentation theory is a triple (P, R, D) where P ⊆ L is a set of premises, R is a set of strict rules and D is a set of defeasible rules. The set Arg aspic (P, R, D) is the set of all (D, R)-derivations of some φ ∈ L from some finite ∆ ⊆ P. Given two arguments a, b ∈ Arg aspic (P, R, D), a rebuts b iff there is a φ ∈ DefC(b) such that Conc(a) ∈ φ; a undercuts b iff a ∈ n(R) for some R ∈ DefR(b). Attack diagrams, underlying Dung-semantics and consequence relations ∼ aspic Sem are then defined in the usual way. To represent ASPIC in our setting we first need to define our derivability relation and then translate the ASPIC attacks. In case the set of strict rules R presents domain-specific knowledge we define:
If R is generated via an underlying core logic we define:
For reasons of space we omit the proof that, where S = {R, n(R), Conc(R) | R ∈ D} ∪ {→ ψ | ψ ∈ P} and · = id(·), 8 the setting
Remark 7. Analogous to Remark 5, if ( †) holds, we obtain Non-Interference for the presentation ( † aspic ) and for ( ‡ aspic ) if additionally the underlying logic L satisfies Pre-Relevance.
Remark 8. Our representation of ASPIC makes use of the pointed · (namely id) and (D, R)-derivability satisfies Cut. Note that AF ⊢ +φ (S ∪R) [resp. AF ⊢ +φ (S)] adequately represents the ASPIC argumentation theory (P ∪ {φ}, R, D) for ⊢ in ( † aspic ) [resp. for ⊢ in ( ‡ aspic )] and S as specified in Example 12. Thus we obtain Cumulativity for grounded semantics.
Meta-Theory
We will now present the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3. 6 Usually edges are not labeled with rules in ASPIC (and so in cases of rules with empty bodies, there are usually no child-nodes either). We introduce these labels since they enable us to define our representation in a simpler way. We also simplify the presentation in that we do not assume there to be defeasible premises. 7 Similar as in the case of ABA we enrich the language L for ⊢ to track syntactic relevance. See Fn. 5. 8 For the variants ASPIC − [10] and ASPIC ⊖ [15] where rebut is unrestricted we need to add StrC(a) to Γ in ( † aspic ) and ( ‡ aspic ). For generalized rebut in ASPIC ⊖ we can proceed analogous to Ex. 2.
Syntactic Relevance
In this section we prove Theorem 1. In the following we suppose that AF ⊢ is a setting that satisfies Pre-Relevance (see Def. 12). We start with some notations: Definition 20. Where S ⊆ L and a, b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S), we write a b iff Supp(a) ⊆ Supp(b).
Definition 21. Where S ⊆ L and E ⊆ Arg ⊢ (S), let Defended(E, AF ⊢ (S)) be the set of all arguments a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) that are defended by arguments in E.
In view of the monotonicity of · we have:
Complete extensions are closed under :
Conflict-free: Assume for a contradiction that there are a, a ′ ∈ E ∪ E ′ such that a attacks a ′ . By the conflict-freeness of E and E ′ it is not the case that a, a ′ ∈ E or a, a ′ ∈ E ′ . Wlog. suppose a ∈ E and a ′ ∈ E ′ . By Lemma 2, there is a b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ′ ∩ Supp(a)) = Arg ⊢ (∅) that attacks a ′ . Thus, b is trivially defended by E ′ and by the completeness of E ′ , b ∈ E ′ . This is a contradiction to the conflict-freeness of E ′ . Admissibility: Suppose some b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ) attacks some a ∈ E ∪ E ′ . Wlog. assume a ∈ E. By Lemma 2, there is a b ′ ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∩ Supp(b)) that attacks a. Thus, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b ′ . By Fact 3, c attacks b.
By Def. 12 (iii), Γ ∩ S i ⊆ Γ and hence b ′ attacks a. For Item 2 note that i = 1 when setting T 1 = Γ and T 2 = ∅ in Def. 11.
Proof. Ad 1. Suppose E defends some a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ). By Lemma 4 and Fact 4, E 1 ∪ E 2 defends a. Ad 2. Note that E 1 is conflict-free since E is conflict-free. Suppose b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) attacks some a ∈ E 1 . Thus, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b. By Lemma 4 and Fact 4, E 1 attacks b. Thus, E 1 is admissible. Suppose E 1 defends some d ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). Then E defends d and hence d ∈ E ∩ Arg ⊢ (S) = E 1 . Hence, E 1 is complete.
2. E ∈ Cmp(AF ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ )).
Proof. Ad 1. Suppose a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) ∩ E. Thus, a it is defended by E 1 ∪ E 2 in AF ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ). Suppose some b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 that attacks b. If c ∈ E 2 , by Lemma 2, there is a c ′ ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∩ Λ) = Arg ⊢ (∅) that attacks b. Since c ′ has no attackers, by the completeness of E 1 , c ′ ∈ E 1 . Altogether this shows that a ∈ Defended(E 1 , AF ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ )). Again, by the completeness of E 1 , a ∈ E 1 . Thus, E ∩ Arg ⊢ (S) = E 1 . Analogously, E ∩ Arg ⊢ (S ′ ) = E 2 . This is Item 1. Ad 2. Suppose there are a, b ∈ E such that a attacks b. We know that there is a c ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 that attacks a. Wlog. suppose c ∈ E 1 . Thus, there is a d ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 that attacks c. Since by Lemma 3,
we have reached a contradiction. Thus, E is conflict-free. Suppose now some a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ) attacks some b ∈ E. By the definition of E there is a c ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 that attacks b. By item 1, c ∈ E. Thus, E is admissible.
For completeness assume that E defends some a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ). Suppose b = (Λ, β) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ ) attacks a. Hence, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b. In view of Lemma 4 and Fact 3 there is a c
) this is a contradiction to E 1 and E 2 being preferred.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose S ∪ {φ} | S ′ . We show that S |∼ sem φ iff S ∪ S ′ |∼ sem φ. (⇒) Suppose S ∪ S ′ |∼ sem φ. Thus, there is a E ∈ Sem(AF ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ )) for which there is no a ∈ E with conclusion φ. By Lemmas 5 and 8, E 1 = E ∩ Arg ⊢ (S) ∈ Sem(AF ⊢ (S)). Since there is no a ∈ E 1 with conclusion φ, S |∼ sem φ.
(⇐) Suppose S |∼ sem φ. Thus, there is a E ∈ Sem(AF ⊢ (S)) for which there is no a ∈ E with conclusion φ. By Lemma 7, there is a E ′ ∈ Sem(AF ⊢ (S ∪ S ′ )) for which E ′ ∩ Arg ⊢ (S) = E. Assume for a contradiction that there is an argument a ∈ E ′ with Conc(a) = φ. By the Pre-Relevance of ⊢, there is an a ′ = (Γ ′ , φ) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S ∩ Supp(a)). By Fact 4, a ′ ∈ E which contradicts our main supposition. Thus, S ∪ S ′ |∼ sem φ.
Semantic Relevance
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Theorem 4 below. Remark 9. The grounded extension can be characterized inductively as follows: Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) = α≥0 Grd α (AF ⊢ (S)) where Grd 0 (AF ⊢ (S)) = Defended(∅, AF ⊢ (S)), for successor ordinals α + 1: Grd α+1 (AF ⊢ (S)) = Defended(Grd α (AF ⊢ (S)), AF ⊢ (S)), and for limit ordinals β: Grd β (AF ⊢ (S)) = Defended( α<β Grd α (AF ⊢ (S)), AF ⊢ (S)).
Theorem 4.
Where AF ⊢ = (⊢, ·,·), ⊢ satisfies Cut and · is pointed, if S |∼
Proof. Ad 1. This is due to the fact that S |∼
by Cut. This is a contradiction since b ′ attacks a. So a has no attackers in Arg ⊢ +φ and so a ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ +φ (S)).
Altogether this shows that a is defended by Grd(AF ⊢ +φ (S)) and thus a ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ +φ (S)).
The case for limit ordinals α ′ is analogous.
Ad 3 and 4.
We show both simultaneously via induction. (Base) Let a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Grd 0 (AF ⊢ +φ (S)). Suppose first that a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). Since Arg ⊢ (S) ⊆ Arg ⊢ +φ (S), there are no attackers of a in Arg ⊢ (S) and hence a ∈ Grd 0 (AF ⊢ (S)). Suppose now that a / ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). By Cut, a ′ = (Γ ∪ Φ, γ) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S).
Suppose some b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) attacks a ′ in some β ∈ Γ ∪ Φ. By the pointedness of ·, β ∈ Γ ∪ Φ. Note that β / ∈ Γ since otherwise b attacks a but a has no attackers. Thus, β ∈ Φ. Hence, b attacks (Φ, φ) and is thus attacked by Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). Thus, a ′ is defended by Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) and so a ′ ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). (Step) We consider a successor ordinal α + 1. Let a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Grd α+1 (AF ⊢ +φ (S)). Suppose first that a ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). Suppose some b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ Grd α (AF ⊢ +φ (S)) that attacks b. By the inductive hypothesis, if c ∈ Arg ⊢ (S), c ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) and otherwise (Λ ∪ Φ, σ) ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). In either case Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) defends a from the attacker and thus a ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). Suppose now that a / ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). By Cut, a ′ = (Γ ∪ Φ, γ) ∈ Arg ⊢ (S). Suppose some b ∈ Arg ⊢ (S) attacks a ′ in some β ∈ Γ ∪ Φ. By the pointedness of ·, β ∈ Γ ∪ Φ. If β ∈ Φ, b attacks (Φ, φ) and is thus attacked by Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). If β ∈ Γ, b attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ Grd α (AF ⊢ +φ (S)) that attacks b. By the inductive hypothesis, if c ∈ Arg ⊢ (S), c ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) and otherwise (Λ ∪ Φ, σ) ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)).
In either case Grd(AF ⊢ (S)) defends a from the attacker and thus a ∈ Grd(AF ⊢ (S)). The case for limit ordinals α ′ is analogous.
Our previous result does not generalize to preferred semantics or to ⊢ that do not satisfy Cut. We give two examples. Example 13 ([17] ). Consider an ASPIC framework with defeasible rules D = {n 0 : ⊤ ⇒ p; n 1 : p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p}, facts P = ∅, the strict rules induced by classical logic (see Ex. 12), and φ = ψ if φ = ¬ψ and φ = ¬φ else. Consider the ASPIC-arguments a 0 = ⊤ ⇒ p; a = a 0 → (p ∨ q) and b = a ⇒ ¬p. With ( ‡ aspic ) we have the arguments a 0 = ({n 0 , ⊤ ⇒ p, p}, p), a = ({n 0 , ⊤ ⇒ p, p}, p ∨ q) and b = ({n 0 , n 1 , ⊤ ⇒ p, p, p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p, ¬p}, ¬p) in AF ⊢ (S) where S = {n 0 , ⊤ ⇒ p, n 1 , p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p, p, ¬p}. Note that b attacks a 0 , a and b while a 0 attacks b. Thus, the only preferred extension contains both a 0 and a which means that S |∼ Prf p and S |∼ Prf p ∨ q. Once we move to ⊢ +(p∨q) we also have the argument c = ({n 1 , p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p, ¬p}, ¬p) attacking a 0 . It is easy to see that now S |∼ +(p∨q) Prf p.
can be represented. We studied the properties Non-Interference, Crash Resistance, and Cumulativity. In future work we plan to incorporate priorities (e.g., [1, 11, 18] ) and to extend our study to other meta-theoretic properties, such as other properties of non-monotonic inference ( [16] ) and rationality postulates ( [8] ).
